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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000030

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C  
STATE FOR S/USSES  
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON  
NSC FOR GAVIN  
LONDON FOR POL - LORD  
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [SU](#) [LY](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: THE REAL DEAL?: CHAD-SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT  
TIMETABLE AND DETAILS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 029  
[B.](#) NDJAMENA 028  
[C.](#) NDJAMENA 021

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Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

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SUMMARY  
AND COMMENT  
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[1](#)1. (C) The January 15 Chad-Sudan agreements set a deadline of February 21 for both the GOC and the GOS to accomplish the key element in their rapprochement, "elimination of armed rebel presence on their respective territories," Chad Amb to the U.S. told Ambassador January 16, but both governments have a month's "wiggle room" in case of difficulties. After March 21, Bechir underlined, the GOC and the GOS committed to removing rebels from their soil, either by voluntary repatriation ("going home"); or by remaining and claiming "refugee status;" or by going to a third country "of their choosing." The two sides also agreed to set up border monitoring posts in Abeche and El Geneina NLT February 21.

[1](#)2. (C) Bechir said the agreements could and should work, but that everything depended on the willingness and ability of the two governments to keep their commitments. Bechir said that the GOC was acting in good faith, and that the Chadians generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but that neither the GOC nor the GOS had overcome all suspicion of the others' motives and future plans.

[1](#)3. (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting. We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would be personae non gratae in Sudan, but we think that the Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their safety here. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

¶4. (C) CHAD AMB TO U.S. BECHIR: Chad Amb to the U.S. Bechir briefed Ambassador Nigro late January 16 on the Chad-Sudan peace agreements signed here January 15. Bechir has been a member of FORMIN Faki's negotiating teams, both with the GOS and with JEM, over the past three weeks.

¶5. (C) REBELS OUT BY 21 FEBRUARY: Bechir said that the GOC had committed to eliminating armed Sudanese JEM rebels from Chadian soil NLT February 21 and the GOS had committed to similar elimination of armed Chadian rebel groups from Sudanese soil NLT than February 21.

¶6. (C) BORDER MONITORING POSTS: Bechir said that the GOC and GOS had agreed to set up the first stage of the border monitoring mechanism with posts in Abeche, Chad and El Geneina Sudan, also by February 21.

¶7. (C) WIGGLE ROOM: Bechir said that there was some flexibility built into these timetables. If one side or the other encountered technical or other difficulties in completing the elimination of rebels, they could ask for a delay until March 21.

¶8. (C) REBELS INTO REFUGEES?: Bechir said that after March 21, rebels would either have returned to their own country, or elected to remain "as refugees only."

¶9. (C) DIFFICULT CASES: If either the GOS or GOC encountered a few "difficult cases" of recalcitrant rebel chiefs who refused of those alternatives (repatriation or refugee status), that government would have to notify the other of the situation and take steps to see that the reluctant rebels ("one or two," Bechir said) made plans to go to a third country of their choosing.

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¶10. (C) TRUST BUT VERIFY?: Bechir said the agreements could and should work, but everything depended on the willingness and ability of the two governments to keep their commitments. Bechir said that the GOC was acting in good faith, and that the Chadians generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but that neither the GOC nor the GOS had overcome all suspicion of the others' motives and future plans.

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COMMENT  
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¶11. (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting. We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would be personae non gratae back in Sudan, but we think that the Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their safety here.

¶12. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO